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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the introduction of premiums into the SCHIP program in Kentucky.  
Kentucky introduced a $20 monthly premium for SCHIP coverage for children with 
family incomes between 151% and 200% of the federal poverty level in December 2003.  
Administrative data between 2001 and 2004 is used to estimate a Cox proportional 
hazard model that predicts enrollment duration in this premium-paying category.  The 
results suggest that a premium reduces the length of enrollment and that the effect is 
much stronger in the first two months after the introduction of the premium.  Similar 
results are not found for the non-premium category.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was created by the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act.  Its purpose 
was to initiate and expand health insurance coverage for uninsured, low-income children.  
The statute set a broad outline for the program’s structure and gave states flexibility in 
creating programs to meet their own needs.  States could create or expand their own 
separate insurance programs, expand their Medicaid program, or some combination of 
the two.  The federal government would reimburse states for SCHIP expenses according 
to a matching rate based on state income.  The 1998 federal budget allocated $24 billion 
dollars to the states for SCHIP. 
The flexibility provided by the federal government included giving states the 
ability to vary the amount of cost sharing imposed in a separate (non-Medicaid) SCHIP 
program, subject to certain limits.  Premiums and co-payments may not exceed 5% of 
family income for children whose family incomes exceed 150% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL).  There is a much lower limit on cost sharing for children in families with 
income below 150% FPL.  According to a report published by the Kaiser Commission 
(Ross and Cox (2005)), as of July 2004, 33 states imposed premiums or annual 
enrollment fees for SCHIP coverage, with 11 states charging premiums for children in 
families with incomes of 101% FPL and above. 
Because average state public insurance spending growth has exceeded the growth 
in state tax revenue in past several years, some states have introduced or increased 
premiums in their SCHIP programs.1  According to Ross and Cox (2005), during their 
                                                 
1 See the November 2005 Kaiser Commission fact sheet “State Fiscal Conditions and Medicaid” Figure 2.  
The URL is: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/4087-04.pdf 
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survey period, 16 states imposed premiums for the first time, increased premiums, or 
lowered the income level at which premiums are charged. 
Although most of the empirical literature on SCHIP to date has examined the 
introduction and implementation of this program across states, there is a new and 
growing strand of literature that analyzes the impact of cost sharing on enrollment in 
SCHIP programs.  Shenkman et al. (2002) and Shenkman and Vogel (2005) examine 
premium changes in Florida’s SCHIP program in 1998 and 2003, respectively.  Kenney 
et al. (2005) provides a comparative study of three states that either introduced 
(Kentucky) or raised (New Hampshire and Kansas) premiums in 2003.  The general 
approach these papers take is to predict the duration of enrollment in the premium-paying 
category of SCHIP using a Cox proportional hazard model with a time varying covariate 
to model the change in premiums.  The common result is that the duration of enrollment 
depends on premiums, in addition to other dimensions of the program, such as the yearly 
recertification process to maintain coverage.  
In this paper, the impact of the introduction of a premium on the duration of 
premium-paying SCHIP enrollment spells in Kentucky is examined using a Cox 
proportional hazard model.  This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of 
premiums in a number of ways.  First, data on child enrollment in all public insurance is 
used to observe whether or not children move into other categories of public insurance 
after leaving the premium-paying category of SCHIP.  In some states, administrative data 
is stored in such a way so that movements between SCHIP and Medicaid cannot be 
tracked.  Second, unlike the previous studies, different specifications are used to assess 
whether the short run impact of the policy change differed in magnitude from the longer 
 3
run impact.  Third, because Kentucky has a premium-paying and a non-premium-paying 
category in its SCHIP program, enrollment spells from the non-premium-paying category 
can by used to help determine if the relationship observed between premiums and 
enrollment in the premium-paying category is causal. 
The results suggest that the introduction of a premium has a negative impact on 
the length of enrollment in the premium-paying SCHIP category and that the effect is 
much stronger in the first two months following the policy change than in the subsequent 
months.  The estimated probability that an average child ends their enrollment spell in the 
first two months following the introduction of the premium is 21%.  The estimated 
probability of leaving in the subsequent seven months is 5.43%.  These estimates should 
be compared to the average monthly exit probability in the data, which is 5.02%.  Similar 
results are not found for the non-premium-paying SCHIP category.  These findings are 
potentially useful to other states considering imposing or increasing premiums in their 
own SCHIP programs. 
In the next section, the literature described above is discussed in more detail, as is 
the relationship between the literature and this paper.  In section three, programmatic 
features of the SCHIP program in Kentucky are described as well as the data used in the 
analysis.  Section four discusses the Cox proportional hazard model estimated in this 
paper and section five presents the results.  The final section offers conclusions, 
extensions, and policy implications. 
II. Literature Review 
As mentioned above, Shenkman et al. (2002) and Shenkman and Vogel (2005) 
examine premium changes in Florida’s SCHIP program in 1998 and 2003, respectively.  
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Florida’s SCHIP program (Healthy Kids) covers children with family incomes between 
101% and 200% FPL.  Children with family income at or below 100% FPL are eligible 
for Florida Medicaid.  Because these two studies use data from the Healthy Kids program 
and not Florida Medicaid, it is possible that some of the children they observe exiting 
Healthy Kids may be moving to Medicaid.  If this movement is not taken into account, 
the length of the child’s spell of public health insurance coverage may be underestimated.  
A similar issue arises in the Kenney et al. (2005) three state study.  In their analysis, the 
length of an enrollment spell is measured as the number of consecutive months enrolled 
in the premium-paying category of the particular state’s SCHIP program.  
From a policy perspective, a natural question is whether movements from 
premium-paying SCHIP to other public coverage (non-premium-paying SCHIP or 
Medicaid) should be considered an “exit” since the child is continuing to receive public 
coverage.  In this paper, I follow Allison (2003) and treat continued enrollment in other 
public coverage as a part of a child’s premium-paying SCHIP enrollment spell.  For 
example, in the previous literature, if a child was enrolled in premium-paying SCHIP for 
6 months and then transferred to Medicaid for 5 months before leaving public coverage 
entirely, their enrollment spell would be assigned a length of 6 months.  In this paper, I 
assign the spell a length of 11 months. 
The Florida studies as well as the Kenney et al. (2005) study model a state’s 
change in premium policy as a time varying covariate that equals zero prior to the policy 
change and one afterwards.  Such a specification does not allow for any difference 
between the immediate impact of the policy change on enrollment duration and the 
longer run impact.  Another natural policy question is whether recipient responses differ 
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over time.  In order to address this question, I estimate models using different pairs of 
short run and long run indicators and compare to see which specification best fits the 
data.   
 In many of the states previously studied, such as Florida and New Hampshire, 
premiums are required for all participants in the state’s SCHIP program (other than some 
exceptions based on age).  Kentucky and Kansas only require SCHIP premiums for 
families in the upper half of the eligible income distribution (151% to 200% FPL).  
Families with income between 101% and 150% FPL are not required to pay SCHIP 
premiums in either Kansas or Kentucky.  This non-premium-paying category of SCHIP 
provides a natural control group to compare against the premium-paying category in 
order to help determine if the relationship observed between premiums and enrollment in 
the premium-paying category is causal.  To date, it does not appear that the literature has 
taken advantage of this treatment versus control relationship between the two categories 
of SCHIP enrollment.  In this paper, I apply the same model to the non-premium-paying 
SCHIP enrollment spells in the data and compare the results to those pertaining to the 
premium-paying SCHIP enrollment spells.  
III. Background on SCHIP in Kentucky and Data 
In order to initiate their SCHIP program, the commonwealth of Kentucky was 
allocated federal funds of $50 million per year for five years to be matched by $13 
million per year in state funds.  This money was used to establish the Kentucky 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (KCHIP).  The first phase of the program began on 
July 1, 1998 by extending Medicaid coverage to children 14 through 18 years old who are 
in families at or below 100% FPL.  Today children under the age of 19 with family 
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income at or below 100% FPL are eligible for Medicaid.  Children under the age of 19 
with family income between 101% and 150% FPL are eligible for KCHIP II, which was 
set up as a further expansion of Medicaid.  Children under the age of 19 with family 
income between 151% and 200% FPL are eligible for KCHIP III, which was set up as a 
stand alone program. 
Initially KCHIP did not charge any premium for this insurance coverage and only 
modest out of pocket expenses, such as a $2 co-payment for office visits.  Falling tax 
revenue and increasing expenses made this financing approach more difficult for the 
commonwealth to maintain.  For these reasons, Kentucky began in December 2003 
charging a $20 monthly premium for families with children covered by KCHIP III.  This 
change was possible without a federal wavier because KCHIP III is a stand alone 
program.2   
Table 1 provides the total monthly public coverage enrollment count by eligibility 
category for children in Kentucky.  Figures 1 – 3 provide graphs for KCHIP III 
enrollment, KCHIP II enrollment, and Medicaid enrollment, respectively.  The figures 
illustrate that there was a noticeable reduction in KCHIP III enrollment following the 
policy change that was not evident at the same time in previous years.  At the same time, 
enrollment in KCHIP II increased slightly and enrollment in Medicaid by children 
continued to grow.  This descriptive evidence suggests that the premium may have had 
some impact on enrollment in public health insurance programs in Kentucky. 
 In order to formally evaluate the impact of the introduction of a premium on the 
duration of enrollment spells in the premium-paying SCHIP category (KCHIP III), 
                                                 
2 Since it was created through an expansion of Medicaid, a waiver would be required in order to introduce 
similar premiums into KCHIP II. 
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administrative data on enrollment between December 2001 and August 2004 (33 months) 
was provided by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.3    The 
administrative database provides information on monthly enrollment and program status, 
as well as demographic variables including age, gender, race, and region of residence.   
 This paper focuses on the 46,068 first new KCHIP III enrollment spells initiated 
during the 33 month period for children aged 1-18 with no missing demographic 
information.4  A new KCHIP III enrollment spell is defined to start in the month that a 
child moves into KCHIP III, whether they had no public coverage in the previous month 
or were covered under KCHIP II or Medicaid.5  The spell ends when the child exits 
public coverage completely.  For example, suppose a child moves from Medicaid into 
KCHIP III in December 2001, remains enrolled in KCHIP III for 12 months, and then 
transfers to KCHIP II for 11 months before leaving public coverage.  This child’s 
enrollment spell would be counted as part of the December 2001 cohort and the length of 
their spell would be measured as 23 months.6  As mentioned, the approach used in the 
Florida studies, as well as Kenney et al. (2005), had been to measure the spell as lasting 
12 months.   
Table 2 illustrates the total number of first new KCHIP III spells that start in each 
of the 33 months analyzed and then breaks the monthly total down by spell origin (a 
move from no public coverage, from Medicaid, or from KCHIP II).  Notice that the first 
24 cohorts start their enrollment spells prior to the introduction of the premium and that 
                                                 
3 This implies there are 24 months of data prior to the policy change (December 2001 – November 2003) 
and 9 months of data after the policy change (December 2003 – August 2004). 
4 There are a total of 47,301 new KCHIP III enrollment spells initiated during this period.  This implies that 
1,233 children were dropped from the analysis due to the age criteria or due to missing information.     
5 Focusing on new KCHIP III enrollment spells ensures that the KCHIP III spells analyzed are not left-
censored. 
6 Because enrollment is measured in months, a child enrolled for any part of a month is considered enrolled 
for the entire month. 
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the last 9 cohorts start their enrollment spells after the premium was introduced.  The 
table shows that 29% of all spells considered result from a move from no public coverage 
into KCHIP III, 41% result from a move from Medicaid, and 30% result from a move 
from KCHIP II.  The origin of the spell is used as a control variable in the hazard model 
presented in the next section. 
 Table 3 illustrates the number of exits by month.  Since a movement from KCHIP 
III to other public coverage is not considered an exit, a child’s spell ends if they turn 19 
(such a spell is treated as right-censored), if their family does not pay the premium 
(starting in December 2003), or if they exit for an “other” reason.  Other reasons include, 
but are not limited to, obtaining private coverage, increases in family income, or leaving 
the state.  Exits due to aging out or nonpayment of the premium are identifiable in the 
administrative database.  If a child exits for any other reason, they are included in the 
“other” category.  According to the table, 20,829 of the KCHIP III spells analyzed end in 
an exit (including children who age out).  This represents 45% of all KCHIP III spells 
analyzed.  Of these exits, 6% were due to the child turning 19, 19% were due to 
nonpayment of the premium, and 75% were due to some “other” reason.  This implies 
that 25,239 children, or 55% of all children in the sample, were still enrolled on August 
31, 2004.  These spells are treated as right censored.   
 Descriptive statistics for all children and by exit route are presented in Table 4.  
There are more children aged 1-5 or 6-12 than aged 13-18 in the data.  There are almost 
as many female children as males.  Non-whites make up 12% of all spells, but notice that 
16% of the spells that end in non-payment represent non-white children.  The average 
number of siblings also covered under public coverage is 1.15 children and the average 
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spell length in the data is 8.51 months.  Although 24% of all spells are covered under a 
managed care program within KCHIP, 29% of spells that end in non-payment come from 
managed care.  Finally note that relative to all new KCHIP III spells, spells that start as a 
result of a move from no previous public coverage are more likely to end in non-payment 
(29% versus 37%).  KCHIP III spells that start as a result of a move from Medicaid or 
KCHIP II are less likely to end in non-payment. 
IV. Model 
 
The decision being modeled is whether a family with a child enrolled in KCHIP 
III chooses to exit public coverage.  I assume that the family compares the expected 
utility from leaving public coverage to that from remaining.  A family chooses to leave if 
the expected pay-off from leaving is higher than from staying.  This depends on the net 
income associated with each alternative.   By assumption, families face this decision on a 
monthly basis. 
To be more specific, the duration of the KCHIP III enrollment spells described 
above is estimated using a Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates to 
model the yearly recertification process and the introduction of the premium.TP7 PT  The model 
used here is essentially the same as the model estimated in the Meyer (1990) study of the 
duration of unemployment benefits.  The notation used in the Meyer (1990) study is 
adopted here.  Let TBi B be the length of child i’s KCHIP III enrollment spell.  Using this 
notation, the hazard for child i at time t, λ Bi B(t), is defined as follows: 
[ ] )(|lim
0
t
h
tTitThtprob
i
i
h
λ=≥≥>+
+→
. (1)
    
The hazard is parameterized using a proportional hazards format: 
                                                 
TP
7
PT See Cox (1972) for further discussion. 
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λ Bi B(t) = λB0B(t) exp{XBi B(t)′β}. (2)
 
Here λ B0B(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, which is unknown.  XBi B(t) is a vector of 
time dependent explanatory variables for child i that include dummies for yearly 
recertification, dummies to capture the short run and the long run impact of the policy 
change, the demographic variables described in table 4, and a series of regional controls.  
Finally, β is a vector of coefficients associated with the explanatory variables and is 
unknown.  Because controls for the recertification process are included in XBi B(t), no formal 
attempt will be made to estimate the baseline hazard λ B0B(t).  Instead, I will use the average 
monthly exit probability in the KCHIP III sample, 5.02%, as an estimate of the average 
hazard when interpreting the estimated coefficients of the model. 
 The probability that a KCHIP III enrollment spell lasts until t can be written as a 
function of the hazard: 
[ ] [ ]))()'(exp(exp|1 ttXtTtTP iii γβ +−=≥+≥  (3)
 
where 
{ }∫ += 1 0 )(ln)( tt duut λγ  (4)
 
and it is assumed that XBi B(t) is constant between time periods.  The log-likelihood function 
for a sample of N children can be written as: 
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where γ = [γ(0) γ(1) … γ(T – 1)]′, CBi B is the censoring time, δBi B = 1 if TBi B ≤ CBi B and 0 
otherwise, and k Bi B = min(int(TBi B), CBi B).  Spells lasting longer than 33 months are censored at 
T = 33.  Thus the log likelihood function is a function of β and the 32 elements of γ.  The 
likelihood can be maximized by standard methods. 
Unlike Meyer (1990), I will not, in addition, control for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the individual level.  Instead, in the estimation of the standard errors, I will take into 
account family level correlation between observations.  This is essentially the same as 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or shared frailty) at the family level.  One 
could argue that for decisions regarding enrollment and eligibility for public health 
insurance that heterogeneity at the family level is what really matters.  Eligibility is 
determined at the family level and the premiums are assessed at the family level in 
Kentucky.  Controlling for heterogeneity at the level of an individual child level may 
cause one to ignore characteristics of siblings that influence that child’s insurance status. 
V. Results 
Table 5 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model explaining the 
duration of enrollment spans in KCHIP III.  Each variable except the number of siblings 
and the monthly unemployment rate is a dummy variable.  First the program structure 
variables that measure the effect of recertification and the premium are discussed.  Recert 
1 is a time varying dummy variable that equals one during the months of an enrollment 
spell in which children are typically required to complete their first recertification 
(months 12, 13, and 14).8  Recert 2 is a time varying dummy variable that equals one 
during the months associated with the second recertification (months 24, 25, and 26).  
The short run premium indicator equals one in December 2003 and January 2004.  The 
long run premium indicator is equal to one from February 2004 onward.  Notice that the 
short run premium indicator is interacted with a series of the other explanatory variables 
                                                 
8 In Kentucky, recipients are required to report changes in eligibility status when they occur.  In practice, 
much of this reporting comes during the yearly recertification process.  During this process the family must 
mail in a renewal form, complete a telephone interview, and provide proof of earned and unearned income 
in order to maintain eligibility for the program. 
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in order to assess whether the short run impact of the premium was felt differently by 
different sub-groups.  These interactions imply that some care needs to be taken when 
interpreting the coefficients.  The main effect of each variable must be considered along 
with the effect of its interaction with any others when describing the complete effect of 
the variable on enrollment duration. 
The last column gives the “absolute” effect for each explanatory variable, 
evaluated at the sample means.  This column may be the most appropriate to discuss 
since it combines the main effects and the interaction effects for each variable.  In order 
to understand how to interpret these numbers, consider Recert 1.  The table says that 
when an average child’s spell lasts until the first recertification period the probability of 
exiting at that point is 17%, holding everything else constant.  It is natural to ask whether 
or not that seems like a high number.  The question is, compared to what?  As mentioned 
previously, I am using the average monthly exit probability in the KCHIP III sample 
(5.02%) as a proxy for the average hazard including the baseline hazard, so the numbers 
in the column describing the absolute effects should be compared to 5.02%.  Thus the 
absolute effects for both the first recertification (17%) and the second recertification 
(11%) are much larger than the baseline hazard.  Despite this, the magnitude of the 
recertification impact on enrollment may be lower here than in other studies because 
transfers to other public coverage are not treated as exits.  Presumably a large portion of 
these transfers occur during the recertification period when the state assesses the family’s 
eligibility status.  If these transfers were treated as exits, then the magnitude of the effects 
of the recertification variables would be higher. 
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The most striking result is the large exit probability associated with the first two 
months after the premium is introduced.  If the average child is enrolled when the 
premium is introduced, then the probability they exit public coverage in the next two 
months is 21%, holding everything else constant.  The long run premium dummy 
suggests that if they remain enrolled during the first two months after the premium is 
introduced, then they have a 5.43% chance of exiting in the subsequent seven months, 
holding everything else constant.  Notice that this is slightly higher than the baseline 
hazard of 5.02%.  This suggests that the impact of premiums on enrollment is different in 
the short run and in the long run. 
In order to determine which short run / long run combination best fits the data, I 
estimated separate specifications for a 1 month short run, 8 month long run division all 
the way to a 7 month short run, 2 month long run division.  A summary of the results is 
presented in table 6.  The model presented in table 5 dominates the other specifications 
because it has the maximum log likelihood value.  As one moves down the table the short 
run effect falls as more of months 3-9 after the policy change are averaged together with 
the first two months. 
One way to interpret these results is to assume that families with children in 
KCHIP III decide right away whether or not they are willing to pay the premium.  Those 
that choose not to pay exit quickly.  That would account for the large short run impact of 
the policy change.  Along those same lines, families that do not want to pay the premium 
may be less likely to sign up after the premium is introduced.  This would explain why 
the long run exit probability does not look very different from the average hazard. 
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The estimated effects of many of the interaction terms are statistically significant.  
The interaction terms on the non-white indicator and the managed care indicator are 
larger than one, but the absolute effects of these variables are below the average hazard.  
The Kenney et al. (2005) study finds evidence that premiums have a differential impact 
on non-whites and children covered by managed care.  The difference here may be due to 
the fact that these sub-populations could be more likely to move from KCHIP III into 
other public coverage, so that the increased chances of exiting observed in the Kenney 
study may have actually been an increased chance of moving into other public coverage. 
Although the introduction of the premium was an exogenous change to the price 
of KCHIP III coverage, there is still the question of whether the relationship between the 
introduction of the premium and the subsequent exits from the public coverage causal.9  
One way of addressing the issue of causality is to find a group similar to the KCHIP III 
enrollees that did not experience the increase in price and use them as a control group.  
One possible control group is the set of children enrolled in KCHIP II during the same 
time.  Children enrolled in KCHIP II were not subject to the premium, though they were 
subject to similar conditions as KCHIP III children otherwise.  The main difference 
between the two groups is that, by definition, children in KCHIP II have lower income 
than children in KCHIP III.  In order to compare KCHIP II enrollment spells with KCHIP 
III, data on all new KCHIP II enrollment spells initiated during the same 33 months are 
analyzed.  
                                                 
9 In order to control for changing economic conditions during that time, the state average monthly 
unemployment rate is included in the regression.  This data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics website.  The average monthly unemployment rate in Kentucky during the timeframe analyzed is 
5.56%. 
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Descriptive statistics for the 82,839 first new KCHIP II enrollment spells for 
children aged 1-18 with complete demographic data are provided in Table 7.10  KCHIP II 
children are more likely to be age 6-12 and to be non-white.  On average, KCHIP II 
children have more siblings and shorter enrollment spells.  They are also much more 
likely to have transferred from Medicaid than the KCHIP III children.   
The same Cox proportional hazard model estimated for KCHIP III enrollment 
spells is estimated using KCHIP II enrollment spells in Table 8.  The coefficient on the 
short run post-policy indicator is not individually significant and a joint test of this 
coefficient with all of the interaction coefficients yields an insignificant result.  Though 
not statistically significant, the absolute effect of the premium in the short run, 4.43%, is 
slightly greater than the average monthly exit rate for the KCHIP II sample, which is 
4.01%.  This suggests that if KCHIP III children are similar to KCHIP II children, other 
than the fact that one group was required to pay premiums, one can safely attribute the 
change in the behavior of the KCHIP III children after the premium was introduced to the 
policy change itself. 
VI. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the introduction of a 
premium on enrollment in a state’s SCHIP program.  Administrative data from Kentucky 
is ideally suited to answer this question, since Kentucky recently introduced a premium 
into its SCHIP program.  Unlike the previous literature on premiums, this paper does not 
treat transfers into other public coverage as an exit from the premium-paying category of 
                                                 
10 There were a total of 83,205 first new KCHIP II enrollment spells during the timeframe analyzed.  Of 
those, 366 spells were dropped because of the age criteria or due to missing information.   
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SCHIP.  This helps to ensure that the length of the enrollment spell is measured 
accurately.   
A second innovation of this paper is to model the impact of the premium as 
having a different effect in the first two months immediately following the policy change 
relative to the subsequent months.  The results suggest that the impact of the premium on 
enrollment was much stronger in the first two months than in the subsequent months, so 
modeling the policy change as having a uniform effect would not be appropriate for 
Kentucky.  The split between short and long run was determined by estimating different 
specifications and choosing the one with the highest log likelihood value. 
An additional innovation of this paper is that the non-premium-paying SCHIP 
population in the state is used as a control group in order to assess whether the 
relationship between the premium and the enrollment changes in the premium-paying 
SCHIP category is causal.  Because a joint test on the short run policy change indicator 
and all of its interactions was not statistically significant in the control group, it can be 
inferred that there is a causal relationship between premiums and enrollment changes in 
the premium-paying category of SCHIP. 
These results suggest that perhaps recipients and potential recipients adjust 
quickly to the introduction of more cost sharing.  As mentioned, one way to interpret the 
results is that families decide right away whether they are going to pay the premium and 
exit the program immediately if they choose not to pay.  In addition, because much 
higher exit probabilities are not found after the initial adjustment, perhaps potential 
recipients not willing to pay the premium are not signing up for the program after the 
premium is in place.  States considering changes in their own SCHIP premiums may find 
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these results useful as they attempt to predict the likely impact of any policy changes on 
the enrollment in their programs.  This is especially true for states that are considering the 
introduction of premiums for the first time. 
There are several extensions of interest that would shed further light on the impact 
of premiums.  With more months of data one could observe the recertification process for 
children that entered after the premiums were introduced.  Merging this administrative 
data with claims data would allow for comparisons of the impact of the premium across 
health types for children to estimate how the policy change impacts the sickest children in 
the program.  Finally, if the state decides to increase premiums in the future, one could 
compare that response to the response generated by the initial introduction of a premium. 
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Table 1: Number of Children Enrolled in Public Health Insurance in 
Kentucky by Category 
 
  
Month 
Total 
Public 
Coverage 
  
Medicaid
  
KCHIP 
III 
  
KCHIP 
II 
Dec-01 349,088 301,007 17,664 30,417 
Jan-02 349,886 301,127 18,150 30,609 
Feb-02 351,782 302,350 18,497 30,935 
Mar-02 354,701 304,664 18,859 31,178 
Apr-02 357,175 307,175 18,956 31,044 
May-02 359,438 308,990 19,092 31,356 
Jun-02 360,774 309,901 19,359 31,514 
Jul-02 364,458 313,390 19,418 31,650 
Aug-02 368,842 317,421 19,662 31,759 
Sep-02 369,768 318,459 19,591 31,718 
Oct-02 372,680 320,931 19,692 32,057 
Nov-02 372,036 320,412 19,487 32,137 
Dec-02 371,500 320,449 19,258 31,793 
Jan-03 373,975 322,711 19,349 31,915 
Feb-03 374,809 323,849 19,229 31,731 
Mar-03 378,658 327,363 19,354 31,941 
Apr-03 380,174 329,020 19,343 31,811 
May-03 381,541 330,367 19,385 31,789 
Jun-03 383,054 331,703 19,481 31,870 
Jul-03 385,958 334,400 19,625 31,933 
Aug-03 388,306 336,591 19,707 32,008 
Sep-03 389,836 337,819 19,784 32,233 
Oct-03 392,517 339,916 19,903 32,698 
Nov-03 390,677 338,320 19,447 32,910 
Dec-03 392,463 340,346 18,904 33,213 
Jan-04 391,689 341,315 16,695 33,679 
Feb-04 392,393 342,830 16,253 33,310 
Mar-04 395,909 346,284 16,252 33,373 
Apr-04 396,597 347,599 16,055 32,943 
May-04 396,494 347,761 15,899 32,834 
Jun-04 397,679 348,927 15,837 32,915 
Jul-04 398,241 349,739 15,636 32,866 
Aug-04 396,742 348,626 15,310 32,806 
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Table 2: The Number of First New KCHIP III Enrollment Spells Per Month, 
Total and by Spell Origin 
 
 
 
Cohort 
Start 
Month 
Total 
Number 
of New 
Spells 
From No 
Public 
Coverage 
From 
Medicaid 
From 
KCHIP II
1 Dec-01 1,883 398 794 691 
2 Jan-02 2,473 670 938 865 
3 Feb-02 1,544 564 612 368 
4 Mar-02 1,357 458 572 327 
5 Apr-02 1,355 473 551 331 
6 May-02 1,255 437 540 278 
7 Jun-02 1,348 457 558 333 
8 Jul-02 1,478 481 615 382 
9 Aug-02 1,721 565 686 470 
10 Sep-02 1,808 492 702 614 
11 Oct-02 1,826 553 705 568 
12 Nov-02 1,660 416 664 580 
13 Dec-02 1,376 328 581 467 
14 Jan-03 1,665 528 596 541 
15 Feb-03 1,380 408 542 430 
16 Mar-03 1,285 442 481 362 
17 Apr-03 1,239 405 514 320 
18 May-03 1,231 400 523 308 
19 Jun-03 1,128 382 478 268 
20 Jul-03 1,438 476 585 377 
21 Aug-03 1,447 449 622 376 
22 Sep-03 1,500 439 585 476 
23 Oct-03 1,469 411 614 444 
24 Nov-03 1,339 242 630 467 
25 Dec-03 1,076 264 467 345 
26 Jan-04 1,403 337 572 494 
27 Feb-04 1,221 334 438 449 
28 Mar-04 1,137 335 460 342 
29 Apr-04 1,069 312 486 271 
30 May-04 965 234 405 326 
31 Jun-04 953 261 455 237 
32 Jul-04 984 252 405 327 
33 Aug-04 1,055 166 534 355 
 TOTALS: 46,068 13,369 18,910 13,789 
 PERCENT: 100% 29% 41% 30% 
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Table 3: Number of Exits and Right Censored Spells by Month 
 
 
Date 
Right 
Censored
Did Not 
Pay 
Premium 
Exited for 
Other 
Reason 
 
Total 
31-Dec-01 2 0 44 46 
31-Jan-02 1 0 47 48 
28-Feb-02 8 0 69 77 
31-Mar-02 6 0 110 116 
30-Apr-02 16 0 133 149 
31-May-02 21 0 145 166 
30-Jun-02 16 0 196 212 
31-Jul-02 11 0 227 238 
31-Aug-02 16 0 330 346 
30-Sep-02 36 0 288 324 
31-Oct-02 39 0 429 468 
30-Nov-02 27 0 492 519 
31-Dec-02 39 0 607 646 
31-Jan-03 47 0 557 604 
28-Feb-03 29 0 532 561 
31-Mar-03 29 0 632 661 
30-Apr-03 49 0 544 593 
31-May-03 43 0 530 573 
30-Jun-03 29 0 567 596 
31-Jul-03 55 0 685 740 
31-Aug-03 47 0 718 765 
30-Sep-03 63 0 674 737 
31-Oct-03 62 0 843 905 
30-Nov-03 57 0 842 899 
31-Dec-03 53 1,896 842 2,791 
31-Jan-04 43 394 949 1,386 
29-Feb-04 30 261 569 860 
31-Mar-04 58 309 544 911 
30-Apr-04 53 216 593 862 
31-May-04 54 304 551 909 
30-Jun-04 55 330 620 1,005 
31-Jul-04 56 330 730 1,116 
TOTALS: 1,150 4,040 15,639 20,829 
PERCENT: 6% 19% 75% 100% 
 
• Note that one cannot directly compare each month, because as one moves down the 
table the number of new spells per month are higher than the number of exits.  This 
implies there are more children “eligible” to exit during the later dates. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for KCHIP III Sample 
 
KCHIP III 
Demographic: 
All 
Children / 
Spells 
Spells 
Ending 
in 
Nonpayment
Spells Ending  
for Other 
Reason 
Right 
Censored 
Spells 
# spells / children 46,068 4,045 (9%) 15,634 (34%) 26,389 (57%) 
% Aged 1-5 36% 35% 39% 35% 
% Aged 6-12 37% 38% 34% 39% 
% Aged 13-18 27% 27% 27% 27% 
% Female 48% 48% 48% 49% 
% Non-white 12% 16% 13% 12% 
Avg. # of Siblings 1.15 1.13 1.11 1.18 
% in Managed Care 24% 29% 24% 23% 
Avg. Spell Length 8.51 8.13 8.1 8.82 
% From No Public 
Coverage 29% 37% 33% 26% 
% From Medicaid 41% 37% 42% 41% 
% From KCHIP II 30% 26% 26% 33% 
 
• Note that all differences across the three groups are statistically significant except for 
% female and % aged 13-18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazards Model for KCHIP III 
 
Dependent Variable: Length of KCHIP III Enrollment Spell (average hazard: 5.02%) 
 
 
Variables 
 Hazard 
Rates 
 Standard 
Errors 
  
P - values Absolute Effect 
         
Program Structure Variables        
         
Recert 1 *** 3.72 0.18 < .01 17.26% 
Recert 2 *** 2.37 0.22 < .01 11.47% 
Short Run Premium Dummy (2 months) *** 189.35 69.21 < .01 20.96% 
Long Run Premium Dummy (7 months) *** 1.08 0.03 < .01 5.43% 
         
Other Demographics        
         
# of siblings *** 0.95 0.01 < .01 4.80% 
Female 1.00 0.02 .995 5.01% 
Non-white * 0.94 0.03 0.07 4.85% 
Age 1 to 5 *** 0.93 0.02 < .01 4.66% 
Age 6 to 12 *** 0.79 0.02 < .01 4.01% 
Managed Care 0.80 0.15 0.22 4.02% 
From KCHIP II *** 0.89 0.02 < .01 4.36% 
From Medicaid 0.97 0.02 0.25 4.77% 
Monthly Unemployment Rate ***  
(multiplied by 1,000) 0.99 0.001 < .01 4.94% 
         
Interactions of Short Run Indicator 
with Certain Independent Variables 
  
   
  
  
  
  
         
SR * Recert 1 *** 0.39 0.02 < .01 . 
SR * Recert 2 *** 0.63 0.08 < .01 . 
SR * # siblings 1.01 0.03 0.61 . 
SR * Female 0.97 0.03 0.41 . 
SR * Non-white *** 1.34 0.08 < .01 . 
SR * Age 1 to 5 0.93 0.05 0.13 . 
SR * Age 6 to 12 * 1.09 0.05 0.06 . 
SR * Managed Care 1.05 0.06 0.35 . 
SR * From KCHIP II *** 0.64 0.04 < .01 . 
SR * From Medicaid *** 0.71 0.04 < .01 . 
SR * Monthly Unemployment Rate *** 1.03 0.01 < .01 . 
 
Number of exits = 19,679  Number of spells = 46,068  Log Likelihood = -196,307.35 
 
Controls for region of residence are included but not presented and the standard errors are adjusted for family level correlation. 
 
Note that the large estimated coefficient on the short run premium dummy may be misleading.  One should not consider this 
coefficient without the coefficients on the associated interaction terms.  For this reason, the last column provides the absolute effect of 
each variable.  The absolute effect combines the main effect of each variable with any effects working through interactions with other 
variables.  The estimated absolute effect of the policy change in the short run appears more reasonable. 
 
* = individual coefficient significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1% 
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Table 6 Different Specifications for the Short Run v. Long Run Impact of Premiums 
 
Short Run vs. Long Run 
Breakdown SR impact LR impact Log Likelihood
1 month, 8 months 
Dropped due to 
multicolinearity   -196,482.73 
2 months, 7 months 21% 5%  -196,307.35 
3 months, 6 months 18% 6% -196,311.52 
4 months, 5 months 15% 6% -196,542.06 
5 months, 4 months 14% 6% -196,584.96 
6 months, 3 months 13% 6% -196,678.66 
7 months, 2 months 12% 4% -196,500.90 
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Table 7 Comparing KCHIP III Spells with KCHIP II Spells 
 
Demographic: 
KCHIP III
Spells 
KCHIP II 
Spells 
# spells / children 46,068 82,839 
% Aged 1-5 36% 17% 
% Aged 6-12 37% 52% 
% Aged 13-18 27% 31% 
% Female 48.44% 48.83% 
% Non-white 12% 15% 
Avg. # of Siblings 1.15 1.31 
% in Managed Care 23.56% 24.21% 
Avg. Spell Length 8.51 8.00 
% From No Public Coverage 29% 28% 
% From Medicaid 41% 60% 
% From “Other” KCHIP 30% 12% 
 
• Note that the all differences are statistically significant at 1% except for % female. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Cox Proportional Hazards Model for KCHIP II 
 
Dependent Variable: Length of KCHIP II Enrollment Spell (average hazard: 4.01%) 
 
Variables 
Hazard 
Rates 
Standard 
Errors P - values Absolute Effect 
        
Program Structure Variables       
        
Recert 1 *** 3.70 0.15 < .01 14.65% 
Recert 2 *** 2.00 0.15 < .01 8.03% 
Short Run Premium Dummy (2 months) 0.63 0.26 0.26 4.43% 
Long Run Premium Dummy (7 months) *** 0.76 0.02 < .01 3.05% 
        
Other Demographics       
        
# of siblings ** 0.98 0.01 0.02 3.92% 
Female 1.00 0.01 0.80 4.02% 
Non-white 0.97 0.02 0.31 3.91% 
Age 1 to 5 0.97 0.02 0.22 3.92% 
Age 6 to 12 *** 0.81 0.01 < .01 3.24% 
Managed Care 1.15 0.15 0.30 4.61% 
From KCHIP III 1.01 0.03 0.76 4.09% 
From Medicaid *** 0.85 0.02 < .01 3.39% 
Monthly Unemployment Rate ***  
(multiplied by 1,000) 0.99 0.001 < .01 1.47% 
        
Interactions of Short Run Indicator 
with Certain Independent Variables  
  
   
  
  
        
SR * Recert 1 ** 0.85 0.05 0.01 . 
SR * Recert 2 1.02 0.11 0.88 . 
SR * # siblings 0.99 0.03 0.71 . 
SR * Female 0.98 0.04 0.57 . 
SR * Non-white 1.00 0.07 0.96 . 
SR * Age 1 to 5 1.04 0.07 0.49 . 
SR * Age 6 to 12 1.01 0.05 0.84 . 
SR * Managed Care 1.00 0.06 0.97 . 
SR * From KCHIP III 1.12 0.09 0.16 . 
SR * From Medicaid ** 0.89 0.05 0.03 . 
SR * Monthly Unemployment Rate 1.01 0.01 0.14 . 
 
Number of exits = 26,608  Number of spells = 82,839  Log Likelihood = -282,249.46 
 
Controls for region of residence are included but not presented and the standard errors are adjusted for 
family level correlation. 
 
* = individual coefficient significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1% 
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Figure 1: KCHIP III Enrollment in Kentucky 
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Figure 2: KCHIP II Enrollment in Kentucky 
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Figure 3: Medicaid Enrollment in Kentucky 
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